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Abstract 
 
   This analysis empirically investigates the relationships between resource windfalls, political regimes, conflict 
and economic growth using recent advances in panel estimation methods and a distinctive commodity price 
shock measurement. The paper clarifies many of the ambiguous outcomes of the existing literature, particularly 
showing that resource windfalls have significant impact on conflict only in politically unstable autocracies, 
which itself is heterogeneous in the response conditional on a country’s initial political violence level. The 
findings also demonstrate that resource shocks are positively associated with economic performance in 
democracies and in politically stable autocracies, while significantly deteriorating growth for politically 
unstable autocracies.      
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1. Introduction 
The effect of resource abundance on the growth prospects is a perennially important topic in 
the growth and development literature. How do resource windfalls affect a country’s 
development level? And how do additional revenues generated by resource abundance reflect 
on economic growth? These are important questions, as the effects of income shocks 
generated by resource windfalls cannot be referred to as generic income changes. Because 
resource booms typically translate into direct windfalls into the hands of political elite, these 
shocks may have very different political and economic consequences than other sources of 
income shocks (Sachs and Warner, 2001; Caselli and Tesei, 2011). Considered alternatively, 
resource windfalls may just represent short run gains to an economy which do not feed into 
future development. 
This analysis empirically investigates the relationships between resource windfalls, political 
regimes, conflict and growth using recent advances in panel estimation methods and a 
distinctive commodity price shock measurement. The investigation clarifies the potential 
mechanism behind the ambiguous outcomes of the existing resource literature, particularly 
showing  that resource windfalls have a significant impact on conflict only in politically 
unstable autocracies, which itself is heterogeneous in the response, conditional on a country’s 
initial political violence level. Specifically, a positive shock to an autocratic country’s flow of 
resource rents decreases conflict potential if within-country political violence level is high, 
while for autocracies with relatively low political violence levels the opposite effect occurs. 
The investigation also contributes to the growth literature by showing that resource shocks 
are positively associated with growth in democracies and in politically stable autocracies, 
while deteriorating a country’s economic performance for politically unstable autocracies.  
In order to motivate the empirical analysis and facilitate the interpretation of the results, the 
paper opens the discussion with a novel story as developed in Caselli and Tesei (2011), 
Besley and Persson (2011). Assuming that the governing elite or ruler has complete control 
of the flow of income from natural resources, the growth prospects of a country will depend 
on decisions of the government regarding how to diversify this revenue. Countries where the 
ruler decides to invest into the well-managed development activities are likely to enjoy a 
stable socio-political environment and experience higher economic growth from resource 
windfalls. However if the ruler chooses to invest into “self-preservation” activities, this will 
enhance the likelihood of economic and political instability and lead to diminished growth. 
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Self-preservation activities can range from the mild (e.g., direct and indirect vote-buying, 
imprisoning) to the extreme case scenarios (e.g., violent repression, execution), which will 
also shape the decision of opposition groups of whether or not to challenge the incumbent 
government conditional on the threat level faced. For instance, in the context of potential 
conflict scenarios (where both an incumbent government and an opposition group can each 
make an investment into violence), an increase in resource windfalls, on one hand, may serve 
as an incentive for rebellions promoting rapacity over these resources, and hence increase 
violence by raising the gains from appropriation if they are successful (“state prize” theories); 
on the other hand, it may also serve for the effectiveness of the state to confront the rebellions 
and decrease the likelihood for insurgents of being successful (“opportunity cost” arguments), 
where investment into self-preservation activities by an incumbent government is expected to 
further decrease the incentives of opposition group to resist against the government if the 
threat level is sufficiently large enough. It is also worth mentioning that these outcomes are 
expected to be the case only for countries with unstable political environment and non-
cohesive institutions.  
Considering instead how these effects reflect on economic growth provides another source of 
ambiguity. For instance, investment into self-preservation activities are expected to decrease 
the possibility of conflict and hence promote growth by delivering peace dividends; however, 
it also refers to the amount of investment that could be directed into delivering public goods 
through well-managed development projects, thus leading to reduced growth. Clearly, these 
determinants – resource windfalls, political institutions and violence, all interact to influence 
each other; and the relative dominance and sign of these effects in cross country analysis, as 
well as how these effects are transferred onto growth, can only be ascertained by empirical 
investigation.  
Moreover, the main determinant for the decision-making processes here is the amount of 
revenue accruing from resource windfalls, which is partly determined by the payoff from 
staying in the office, as political survival as a ruler implies that the current elite remains in 
control of future revenues; and partly explained by budget constraints, since at low levels of 
resource income the incentive to engage in self-preservation activities (or oppose the 
incumbent government) is relatively low, as the future “pie” to hold on to is small. At higher 
levels instead the future benefits from holding on to power are sufficiently large; and the 
larger is the “pie”, there is more likelihood that the ruler finds it optimal to spend on self-
preservation. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the long-lasting 
debate in the literature regarding the impact of resource abundance on institutional quality, 
conflict and growth. The methodology and data employed is described in Section 2. Section 3 
presents the estimation results and Section 4 concludes. 
1.1. Related Literature 
Many researchers have noted the resource-led development failures – economic and political 
factors that may have played a role in the disappointing performance of resource-intensive 
economies in the 1970s and 1980s (Gelb, 1988; Auty, 1990), although the adverse effects of 
resource abundance on growth was first confirmed in the 1990s by Sachs and Warner (1995), 
igniting a subsequent tranche of research that focuses on the resource curse paradox. The 
literature has distinguished between no less than three different dimensions of the resource 
curse effect, where resources are associated with (i) slower economic growth, (ii) 
undemocratic regime types, and (iii) violent civil conflict.  
Among the popular early explanations for the curse effect on growth are rent-seeking 
analyses (e.g., Torvik, 2002), and stories based on “Dutch-disease” arguments where the non-
resource sector is the long-run engine of growth due to increasing returns at the sector level, 
but becomes crowded out by the resource sector (Sachs and Warner, 1999). Empirical 
support for this view is provided by various authors, including Ross (1999, 2001a), Leite and 
Weidmann (2002), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), Isham et al. (2005), and Bulte et 
al. (2005). Mehlum et al. (2006) demonstrate that the impact of resource abundance is 
conditional on institutional quality, i.e. while countries with good institutions which promote 
accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource abundance, countries 
without such institutions may suffer from a resource curse (see also Jensen and Wantchekon, 
2004; Robinson et al., 2006). Along with these transmission channels, another feature that 
has emerged in the resource curse literature is the link between resources and conflict 
pioneered by empirical contribution in Collier and Hoeffler (1998).
1
 
                                                          
1
 Although the resource-conflict link is increasingly viewed as a stylized fact in economics and political science 
(see e.g., Ross 2004a), the explanations of this evidence are mixed. Focussing on the economic roots of conflict, 
Fearon (2005), Ross (2006), De Soysa and Neumayer (2007), and Lujala (2009) highlight the role of (legal) oil 
and mineral resource trading. The probability of foreign intervention (Rosser, 2006) and the probability of 
suffering from economic shocks (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005) are other explanations as to why resources might 
be linked to conflict. Other explanations of the resource-conflict link arise around political (state-strength) 
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However the validity of these results has been criticized by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008, 
2009) drawing attention in the literature. The authors disputed the arguments that abundant 
resources lead to bad institutions, higher conflict potential or slower growth by emphasizing 
their concerns regarding the endogeneity of resource exports ratio to GDP where the 
denominator explicitly measures the magnitude of other activities in the economy, i.e. the 
ratio is not independent of economic policies and institutions which is to the large extent 
produced by choices of individual governments.
2
    
In the light of endogeneity concerns regarding the resource rent share, measuring resource 
shocks with changes in international commodity prices is more promising since they are 
typically unaffected by the behaviour of individual countries (Deaton and Miller, 1995).
3
 
Alternatively viewed, since world commodity prices are set in international markets, they are 
less likely to be influenced by the socio-economic and political events in a single country. 
While empirical studies by Deaton and Miller (1995) and Raddatz (2007) do find that 
commodity price shocks raise growth, Collier and Goderis (2009) demonstrate that this 
positive association is only the case in the short-run and an increase in commodity price 
levels can lead to slower growth in the long-run conditional on poor governance. 
A recent literature has also investigated the effect of commodity price shocks on political 
regime types as a proxy for institutional quality.
4
 Using commodity price changes as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
perspectives of (potential) rebels as key decision-makers (e.g., Dunning, 2005; Humpreys, 2005). Ballantine 
(2003) has emphasized that the mix of greed and grievance can be particularly effective and relevant as an 
explanation of the onset of war. These are not to argue that there were no “dissident” views: e.g., Homer-Dixon 
(1999) who suggests resource scarcity, rather than abundance as a driver of violent conflict. 
2
 Alternative measures of resource abundance have been also used in the literature, casting some doubts on the 
consistency and robustness of the curse. For example, Brunnschweiler (2008) finds no curse evidence using 
World Bank resource data; Alexeev and Conrad (2009) employ several measures of resource abundance, 
including hydrocarbon deposits per capita, and oil and mining outputs, and find no negative effects on income. 
Lederman and Maloney (2007) also demonstrate that the resource curse effect disappears when employing 
system GMM.   
3
 During the analysis, the issue of large producers with potential to influence world prices is addressed, with 
findings that the results are robust and not altered by these economies. 
4
 For the relationship between political regimes and income shocks measured other than commodity price 
changes, see e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Acemoglu et al. (2008) who empirically investigated the 
causal relationship between income and democracy; Haber and Menaldo (2011) who concentrated on windfalls 
from natural resources, finding no effect of oil windfalls on greater autocracy. As for the literature studying the 
effects of resource windfalls on political institutions (and institutional quality more broadly) other than 
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instruments for income changes, Burke and Leigh (2010) find insignificant effects of 
commodity-driven income changes on political regimes. Bruckner et al. (2012) instead find a 
positive effect of oil-price shocks interacted with the share of net oil exports in GDP for 
movements towards democracy. A good summary of this literature (with associated 
weaknesses and advantages regarding the approaches employed) is provided in Caselli and 
Tesei (2011) who present an outstanding strategy to capture the effect of commodity price 
shocks on political regime types, with findings revealing that while price shocks have no 
effect on political system in democracies, a positive shock to an autocratic country’s flow of 
resource rents significantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of the political system which 
itself is heterogeneous in the response across deeply and moderately entrenched autocratic 
regimes. 
There is also an emerging literature regarding the link between conflict and commodity 
prices, yet the results are ambiguous. While Bruckner and Ciccone (2010) and Savun and 
Cook (2011) demonstrate that negative shocks to export prices increase the risk of civil 
conflict, Besley and Persson (2008) demonstrate that higher world market prices of exported, 
as well as imported, commodities are strong and significant predictors of higher within-
country incidence of civil conflict.
5
 Differentiating the effect of labour intensive commodities 
and natural resources on conflict within Colombia, Dube and Vargas (2013) show that a rise 
in international prices of oil, coal and gold increases violence, while this association is 
negative when commodities like coffee, sugar, bananas and tobacco are considered (see also 
Angrist and Kugler, 2008).
6
  
Although it seems that the case studies of individual countries offer relatively clear-cut 
evidence, the relationship between resource windfalls and conflict for cross-country analysis 
is not clear. Along with these complications, Bazzi and Blattman (2011) suggest “absence of 
evidence” from resource windfalls on conflict. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
democracy/autocracy, see also the theoretical studies of Baland and Francois (2000), and Torvik (2002), all 
whom study theoretically the consequences of windfalls for rent seeking, and Leite and Weidman (2002) and 
Salai-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) that present corresponding empirical evidence (where rent-seeking is 
usually measured through proxies of corruption).     
5
 See also Besley and Persson (2010), who demonstrate that resource dependence can increase the propensity 
towards conflict while lowering income and state capacity; and Besley and Persson (2011), who show that 
natural disasters are negatively correlated with income per capita and induce greater political violence. 
6
 The theoretical foundation of these perspectives may be traced back to Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2011). 
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2.1. Empirical Methodology 
The investigation firstly explores the link between resource windfalls and conflict following a 
similar specification to Bruckner and Ciccone (2010), where the indicator for civil conflict 
onset linearly responds to the changes in commodity price index. Starting from this 
benchmark, the analysis further investigates the impact of changes in commodity prices on 
conflict possibility, conditional on political institutions and a country’s political violence 
level.
7
  
The analysis then turns to the exploration of how these relationships between resource 
windfalls, political regimes and violence are reflected onto economic growth. The baseline 
investigation for the growth analysis employs similar specification used by Collier and 
Goderis (2009). Letting the subscripts i and t represent country and time period respectively, 
the estimated model can be written as  
                yit – yi(t-1) =  α yi(t−1) + θ1Compricegrowthi(t-1) + φ'Xi(t-1) + β'Zi(t-1) + μt + ξi + εit    (1) 
where y is log of real per capita income, Compricegrowthi(t-1) is the change in commodity 
price index, Xi(t-1) is the vector of interaction variables (political regimes and political 
violence) with price index, Zi(t-1) is a vector of additional control variables, μt is a period-
specific constant, ξi is an unobserved country-specific effect, and εit is an error term. 
The hypothesis for these relationships is that the impact of resource windfalls on both conflict 
onset and economic growth is a non-linear function of a country’s political institutions and 
political violence levels, where the marginal impact of price shocks is increasing while 
within-country political violence (stability) level decreases (increases). Alternatively, 
governments in countries with stable socio-political environments have a greater incentive to 
spend the resource windfalls beneficially, whereas in politically unstable countries with non-
cohesive institutions the resource windfalls may be spent in unproductive directions. 
                                                          
7
 In order to keep the specification straightforward and to concentrate on how the conflict possibility responds 
non-linearly to the changes in commodity price index conditional on political institutions and within-country 
political violence level, the investigation does not include the additional two lags of price index into the 
specification as is done in Bruckner and Ciccone (2010). In addition, it is also worth mentioning that both lags 
demonstrated no impact on conflict onset when are included; thus a parsimonious specification without 
additional lags during the analysis was preferred. 
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The analysis for growth estimation employs the system GMM dynamic panel data estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998).
8
 This approach has the advantage of addressing the issues of joint endogeneity of all 
explanatory variables in a dynamic formulation, and of potential biases induced by country 
specific effects.
9
 Moreover, to ensure that the estimated effect is not driven by the number of 
instruments, the analysis employs the “1 lag restriction” technique introduced by Roodman 
(2009) that uses only certain lags instead of all available lags as instruments. The treatment of 
each regressor according to their exogeneity levels is based on upper and lower bound 
conditions (Roodman, 2006). 
2.2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The initial analysis is based on an unbalanced dynamic panel dataset consisting of 135 
countries over the 1963-2010 period.
10
 The dependent variable, logged per capita real 
(Laspeyres) GDP growth, is constructed using data from the Penn World Tables (PWT 7.1). 
Log of initial income per capita is used as regressor. 
The measure of resource wealth is the commodity export price index which is constructed 
using a similar methodology to Deaton and Miller (1995), Dehn (2000) and Collier and 
Goderis (2009). More specifically, first, data on world commodity price indices and 
commodity export and import values are collected for as many commodities as data 
availability allowed. All commodity price indices are extracted from the IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) dataset, where the list of 54 commodities used to construct the 
composite index is listed in Appendix Table D3. Export and import data by commodity, 
                                                          
8
 Since the dependent variable for the investigation of the relationship between resource windfalls and conflict 
onset is dichotomous, the analysis employs largely preferred in the literature the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimator. In addition, the investigation also considered Logit and Probit models, which indicated that the results 
are robust and not altered by the choice of estimator. The results from employing these additional estimators are 
available upon request. 
9
 Along with coefficient estimates obtained using GMM system estimator, the tables also report three tests of the 
validity of identifying assumptions they entail: Hansen’s (1982) J test of over-identification; and Arellano and 
Bond’s (1991) AR(1) and AR(2) tests in first differences. AR (1) test is of the null hypothesis of no first-order 
serial correlation, which can be rejected under the identifying assumption that error term is not serially 
correlated; and AR (2) test is of the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, which should not be 
rejected. In addition, to deal with heteroskedasticity, the Windmeijer (2005) small-sample correction is applied. 
10
 See Appendix Tables D1 and D2 for the list of countries and descriptive statistics. 
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country and year are collected from the United Nation’s Comtrade data set, which reports 
dollar values of exports and imports according to the SITC1 system, for the period 1963 to 
2010. To construct the composite commodity export price index, total net export value 
(exports minus imports) of all commodities in 1990 for which the country is a net exporter is 
first calculated for each country. Then the individual 1990 net export values for each 
commodity are divided by this total in order to achieve 1990 country-commodity specific 
weights, wi, which are held fixed over time and applied to the world price indices of the same 
commodities to form the country-specific geometrically weighted index of commodity export 
prices. More specifically, for each year and country the geometrically weighted index is 
constructed as follows: 
P =   
  
  
where wi is 1990 country-commodity specific weight and pi is the international commodity 
price index for the commodity i. The weighting item, wi, can be interpreted as a value of 
commodity i in total value of all commodities, n, for constant base year j:  
wi =  
      
        
 
Finally, to allow the effect of commodity export prices to be larger for countries with higher 
commodity exports, the log of geometrically weighted index of commodity export prices for 
each country i and year t, Pit, is weighted by the 1990 share of net commodity exports in a 
country’s GDP, denoted si, resulting in the final shape of the composite commodity price 
index,    
  . This contrasts to Collier and Goderis (2009) (see also Bazzi and Blattman, 
2011), where the final construction is instead realized by multiplying the weighted index with 
export shares which can cause potential endogeneity issues as discussed in Brunnschweiler 
and Bulte (2008). Considered alternatively, this might alter not only the magnitude of the 
commodity price index effect, but its direction as well, while here if anything of commodity 
price index estimates is affected, it will be just the magnitude of the coefficient, not the sign. 
The separate indices for different type of commodities are constructed in a similar way.
11
   
Although the measurement of commodity price shocks using shares of commodities in a 
given year is far from ideal, it has several advantages. Since the index uses a constant base 
                                                          
11
 See also Appendix C for more detailed information regarding the sources and the data coverage methodology 
used to construct the price index. 
10 
 
year, it does not cope well with shifts in the structure of trade. In particular, the index does 
not capture resource discoveries and other quantity shocks after the base year. Nor does it 
capture temporary volume shocks other than those which happen to occur in the base year 
itself. However, since the purpose is to capture price shocks rather than quantity movements, 
but at the same time differentiate between resource abundant and resource scarce countries, it 
is desirable to hold volumes constant. This also avoids possible endogeneity problems arising 
in the event of a volume response to price changes. Nevertheless, the index will understate 
income effects of a given price change. In addition, as discussed above, the geometrical 
weighting scheme has the comparative advantage in avoiding the potential endogeneity issues 
that can be faced with when using arithmetically weighted indices.
12
  
As a proxy for institutional quality outcome, the analysis employs the variable of polity2 in 
the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010), which is widely used in the empirical 
political-science literature (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2008) to measure the position of a country 
on a continuum of autocracy-democracy spectrum. It aggregates information on several 
building blocks, including political participation (existence of institutions through which 
citizens can express preferences over policies and leaders), constraints on the executive, and 
guarantees of civil liberties both in daily life and in political participation, as evaluated by 
Polity IV coders. Polity2 varies continuously from -10 (extreme autocracy) to +10 (perfect 
democracy). The analysis follows the convention in the vast majority of the literature that 
interprets negative values of polity2 as pertaining to autocracies and positive ones to 
democracies (e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2006, 2009). 
Data on civil conflict is obtained from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts 2012 Dataset of the 
International Peace Research Institute’s (PRIO) Centre for the Study of Civil War and the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP). The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database 
defines civil conflict as a “contested incompatibility which concern government and/or 
                                                          
12
 Caselli and Tesei (2011) suggested a nice strategy of using a country’s principal export commodity prices to 
capture the effect of price shocks. However, the analysis here did not follow this strategy since only a few oil 
producing countries are specialised to the point of exporting only a single commodity, so for the majority of 
countries the full ramifications of being a commodity exporter cannot be determined with reference to just a 
single commodity price series. In addition, given the findings from the literature that different type of 
commodities are likely to behave very differently within a given country (see e.g., Dube and Vargas, 2013), 
conditional on everything else being constant, the broad aggregate indices of commodity prices based on export 
baskets of individual country was preferred. 
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territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle deaths”. Civil conflict outbreak is captured 
by defining civil conflict onset indicator that is unity if there is conflict in year t but not in t-1, 
and zero if there is no civil conflict in t and t-1; if there is a conflict in t-1, the year t civil 
conflict onset indicator is not defined. 
To measure the political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on 
governance, the analysis employs the index of internal conflict risk – proxy for stability – 
obtained from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Dataset.
13
 The index ranges from 0 
to 12, where the highest rating is given to those countries where there is no armed or civil 
opposition to the government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, 
direct or indirect, against its own people. The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in 
an on-going civil war. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with 
a maximum score of 4 points and a minimum score of 0 points. The subcomponents are civil 
war/coup threat, terrorism/political violence and civil disorder. 
The analysis also includes the additional set of control variables taken from the empirical 
growth literature: trade openness measured as the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services as a share of GDP; inflation computed as the log of 1 plus the annual consumer price 
inflation rate, where data for both controls is collected from the World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI); and international reserves (from IFS series 1..SZF) over GDP (from PWT 
7.1). 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for growth rates, political contestability and 
violence/stability levels, and probability of conflict onset over the different subsamples 
according to countries’ income (Panel A) and resource dependence levels (Panel B).14 Two 
                                                          
13
 Employing the political violence/stability measure restricts the sample to 119 countries and the time span to 
the period of 1984-2010. Moreover, due to lack of the data for some countries for which data on political 
violence and civil conflict onset is available, the price shocks and conflict analysis was constrained to the 
sample of 77 countries. 
14
 The cut-off levels for low and high-half income groups are taken as in DeJong and Ripoll (2006), where 
country classifications are obtained by mapping classification thresholds as defined by the World Bank’s 
income measures into the corresponding Penn World income measures. The resulting definitions are as follows: 
high-half income countries are those with real per capita GDP above $5,500; and low-half income countries are 
those with real per capita GDP less than $5,499. All classifications are based on the beginning sample income 
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features of these statistics are of particular interest for the analysis. The first aspect is the 
tendency that higher income level countries tend to enjoy relatively rapid growth, better 
institutional quality and experience relatively less (higher) political violence (stability) and 
conflict. Average statistics of growth rates (conflict onset) increase (decrease) when moving 
from the lower to higher income classifications: from 1.698% (0.049) for low-income 
countries to 1.739% (0.035) for high-income countries. Furthermore, the lower (higher) 
income level countries are on average more autocratic (democratic) and likely to suffer from 
unstable political environment: average statistics of polity2 (political stability) increases from 
-0.371 (7.976) to 5.662 (10.07) when moving from the lower to higher income classifications. 
The second facet of these statistics is that relatively low resource dependent countries are 
likely to lie down on the upper-half (more democratic) of autocracy-democracy spectrum and 
enjoy relatively higher political stability: average statistics of polity2 (political stability) 
decreases from 2.408 (8.784) to -1.284 (8.585) when moving from the lower to higher 
resource dependent countries.  
Figure 1 plots how average cross-country political violence/stability levels change across 
political regime types. In order to do so, all observations are divided into eight bins 
depending on the value of polity2, where bin sizes are chosen to have as uniform as possible a 
sample size across bins, while at the same time preserving symmetry the between 
“autocratic” and “democratic” bins. The resulting intervals of the eight bins are for the 
average polity2 values [-10,-8], [-8,-5], [-5,-3], [-3, 0], [0, 3], [3, 5], [5, 8] and [8, 10], 
respectively.
15
 Three features are of note. The first is that for deeply entrenched autocracies 
(interval of [-10,-8]) the average political stability is above the mean illustrating low variation 
in political violence. The second facet of these statistics is that average political stability 
rapidly jumps down below the mean when moving from deeply to less entrenched autocracies 
reaching its minimum average value and maximum variation range for the [-5,-3] interval 
which also demonstrates similar behaviour for the [-3, 0] interval. The third aspect is the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rankings. The threshold for the low and high resource dependence levels are defined as countries with net export 
shares below and above the 75
th
 percentile of the distribution respectively.    
15
 It is of note that none of the countries in the data set lay on bounds of average polity2 level intervals. 
Moreover, since the number of countries with available political violence data is severely low for bottom 
distribution of autocracy-democracy spectrum, the convention of the overlapping intervals is preferred during 
the analysis in order to be able to achieve as large as possible number of observations for small sample sized 
bins.  
13 
 
intuitive tendency that the average political stability gradually increases when moving from 
less democratic to highly democratic subsamples.
16
 
3. Empirical Results 
Aforementioned, the previous literature suggests that income shocks generated by resource 
windfalls might have a heterogenous impact on growth conditional on a country’s governance 
level. In particular, Collier and Goderis (2009) adopting a panel co-integration methodology 
show that resource shocks have an unconditional positive association with growth in the 
short-run, however an increase in commodity price levels may lead to slower growth in the 
long-run conditional on poor governance, which itself is heterogeneous across different type 
of commodities.
17
 A simple illustration of how the impact of resource windfalls on economic 
growth can vary across countries with different income levels, presented in Figure 2, indeed 
provides support for this view.
18
 The plots illustrate a significant positive impact of resource 
windfalls on growth only for the high-half income subsample, while this effect is 
                                                          
16
 The average political stability across democratic bins drastically decreases showing wide variation in political 
violence only for the [5, 8] interval which is mainly driven by the presence of three countries: Colombia, Peru 
and Sri Lanka. Eliminating these countries from the subsample illustrates a monotonic increase (decrease) in 
average political stability (violence) levels when moving from less democratic to highly democratic bins. 
17
 The replication analysis of these relationships is demonstrated in Appendix Table A1. Although the analysis 
in this paper does not purport to test the short-run and long-run impacts of resource windfalls on growth, by 
replicating Collier and Goderis (2009) results using the preferred measurement, the investigation confirms the 
original findings that the impact of commodity price levels on growth can vary in the long-run and across 
different commodity types. In particular, the replication results demonstrate that short-term effects of 
commodity price shocks are always positive and illustrate strong quantitative significance with growth. 
Decomposing the composite commodity export price index levels into point vs. diffuse and energy vs. non-
energy source commodities illustrates that the negative and statistically significant long-run effects might occur 
only in point source and energy source commodity exporting countries. This effect instead is more likely not to 
be detrimental for diffuse and non-energy source commodity exporting countries. For the more detailed analysis 
regarding using co-integration techniques, its requirements, non-linearity results, please see Collier and Goderis 
(2009). 
18
 Scatter plots and fitted relationships between the variables of interest for low and high-half income groups are 
achieved using partial regressions which are obtained in two stages. First, both the dependent variable and the 
isolated independent variable are projected onto the additional set of regressors under consideration. Next, the 
fitted dependent variable is regressed against the fitted independent variable. In each case, the residuals of a 
growth regression on a set of variables are compared with the residuals of commodity price shocks regression on 
the same variables. The figures are produced using least squares regressions where growth and commodity price 
shocks are related linearly. 
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insignificant on average across the lower income distribution subsample, perhaps reflecting a 
contradictory effect induced by institutional quality and political instability, which signifies 
how economic and political factors may have played a role in the disappointing performance 
across resource-intensive economies.  
The role of political institutions (and institutional quality more broadly) in explaining the 
cross-country differences in income levels and economic performances (see e.g. Acemoglu 
et. al., 2005),
19
 as well as how resource abundance might affect institutional quality has been 
largely explored in the literature. A particularly interesting study for the analysis in this paper 
is the recent work by Caselli and Tesei (2011) where the authors document how a country’s 
political institutions respond heterogeneously to the changes from natural resource windfalls. 
Specifically, the results reveal that resource windfalls have no political consequences when 
they occur in democracies. However, in autocracies, the changes in the flow of resource rents 
make the political regimes more autocratic. Moreover, in autocracies the increase in 
autocracy following an increase in resource revenues is diminishing in the initial level of 
autocracy, i.e. the less autocratic the form of government was initially.
20
 Further analysis by 
Caselli and Tesei (2011) also reveals the fact that in autocracies the negative impact from 
resource windfalls is mainly driven by moderately entrenched autocracies, while in deeply 
entrenched autocracies this effect on politics is virtually nil confirming the importance of 
within-country political violence/stability levels in shaping a country’s political institutions.21 
                                                          
19
 See also Sirimaneetham and Temple (2009) who argue that instability can form a binding constraint on 
economies’ growth rates, where for the more stable countries, the measures of institutional quality have more 
explanatory power on economic performance, i.e. fundamentals for growth such as good institutions are not 
strongly associated with growth unless stability is also in place. 
20
 The main findings from Table 3 (columns 3 and 4) as in Caselli and Tesei (2011) are replicated in Appendix 
Table B2 (columns 1 and 2). Appendix B provides more detailed information on the replication analysis. For 
more detailed analysis regarding the relationship between natural resource windfalls and political system, please 
refer to the original paper. 
21
 In addition to the replication exercise, the analysis also estimated the non-linear relationship between price 
shocks and political system conditional on initial political violence/stability levels (columns 3 and 4 in 
Appendix Table B2). The results provide supportive evidence for the original findings and are consistent with 
Figure 1, confirming that price shocks significantly exacerbate political system only in politically unstable 
autocracies and have no impact on politics when they occur in democracies and in politically stable autocracies. 
For more detailed information regarding this investigation, please see Appendix B. 
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The analysis of how the impact of resource windfalls on conflict can be dependent on these 
interactions between political institutions and political violence are presented in Table 2. 
Table 3 instead addresses the issue of how these relationships are reflected onto the economic 
growth. The subsequent Tables 4-8 report a number of sensitivity checks on the results from 
Table 3. In particular, the analysis explores the robustness of the results to: alternative criteria 
for inclusion of countries in the sample based on (i) importance of the shares from natural 
resource rents in the economy; (ii) dropping large commodity producers and (iii) dropping 
subsets of countries for certain aspects of their political contestability levels and (iv) their 
political violence experiences; (v) breaking down the resource wealth by commodity type.  
3.1. Resource Windfalls and Conflict Onset 
The conjecture of this investigation follows the idea that the impact of resource windfalls on 
conflict outbreak is a non-linear function of a country’s political institutions and effective 
political violence/threat posed by internal forces (incumbent government vs. opposition 
group). Alternatively, in the presence of stable socio-economic and political environment and 
cohesive institutions, resource windfalls have no impact on conflict onset. However, for 
countries with non-cohesive institutions and unstable political background, the impact of 
resource windfalls on conflict depends on the threat level that incumbent 
government/opposition group faces with. Specifically, if the initial within-country violence 
level is high, an increase in resource windfalls is expected to increase the investment into 
self-preservation activities and hence state capacity, and therefore decrease conflict 
possibility by reducing incentives of potential opposition groups to confront the incumbent 
government. However, if the initial threat/violence level is relatively low (or the chance of 
opposition group to be successful and replace the incumbent government is relatively high), 
an increase in resource windfalls is expected to increase the incentives of opposition group by 
raising the gains from appropriation, and therefore increase the conflict possibility. The 
overall impact from the cross-country analysis will also vary on the relative strength of the 
two effects within violence groups. 
Estimation results of the resource-conflict link analysis are presented in Table 2. The first 
column derives this relationship linearly where civil conflict onset responds to the changes in 
commodity price index, controlling for country and time fixed effects. The results are similar 
to those found in the existing literature where the risk of civil conflict outbreak is higher 
when the change in price of export commodity index drops. The statistically significant effect 
16 
 
implies that a one standard deviation drop in countries’ commodity price indices is associated 
with an increase in the probability of a civil conflict onset of about 0.67 percentage points.
22
  
The subsequent two columns estimate this relationship non-linearly using the following 
strategy. Firstly, the specification in column 2 adds the initial level of political 
violence/stability both, by itself and interacted with price index change; while column 3 runs 
the same exercise by separating the change in price index into two variables according to the 
initial political contestability level: the first is an interaction between the change in the price 
index and a dummy for democracy and the second is an interaction with dummy for 
autocracy.  
The results from the non-linear estimation of these relationships provide support for the 
conjecture, and indicate that positive shocks in commodity prices have even larger negative 
direct impact on conflict outbreak in politically violent countries. The coefficients on the 
interaction terms are significant and positive in all cases, implying a positive marginal impact 
of resource windfalls while within-country political threat level decreases. Stratifying this 
association for countries with autocratic/democratic regime types reveals that the significant 
consequences from price shocks is only present in autocratic countries, while resource 
windfalls have no impact on conflict possibility when they occur in democracies. 
As a check on the results, the last column re-estimates the effect of price shocks for the 
subsamples below and above the average political stability level.
23
 In order to do so, the 
change in commodity price index interaction with continuous political violence/stability 
variable is replaced by the price shocks interacted with a dummy that takes the value of unity 
if a country’s initial political stability level is above the sample mean, and zero otherwise. 
Interpretation of the coefficient estimates is as follows: if the findings above are true, then the 
direct impact of changes in price index (referring to high violence level countries) should be 
negative, and the coefficient on interaction term (referring to relatively low violence level 
countries) should be positive. Moreover, in order to have a total positive impact on conflict 
for the subsample with relatively stable political environment, the coefficient of the latter 
                                                          
22
 These measures are obtained by multiplying the coefficient estimate by average standard deviation of 0.011, 
and then multiplying by 100 to convert to a percentage-point measurement. 
23
 Since the investigation does not reveal any differential impact of resource windfalls for democratic countries, 
the specification in column 4 does not break up the democracy specific price index into violence level 
categories.  
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should be significantly larger in absolute value than the former, representing the deviation of 
price shock effects from the reference subsample with high violence levels.
24
   
The results from this exercise are consistent with the findings above where the risk of civil 
conflict outbreak is significantly higher only for autocracies with a politically violent 
environment when the change in price of export commodity index drops. The interaction term 
is positive illustrating that the effect of price shocks for relatively low violence level 
countries significantly deviates from the effect for the reference group with high political 
threat levels. The associated quantitative significance of one standard deviation increase in 
price shocks from splitting the data set into subsamples is estimated as -2.28 percentage 
points among high threat level countries. The magnitude of interaction term implies that this 
effect is positive, albeit on average, is not significantly different from zero for relatively 
stable autocracies. 
In a further effort to probe whether this heterogeneity for price shock effects is somehow 
different across infra-marginal changes in political regimes, Figure 3 plots the estimated 
coefficients of high and low violence specific changes in commodity price index along with 
their relative confidence bands (at 95% level) for each bin given the exclusion of potential 
outliers.
25
 For ease of comparison of the price change estimates, the conflict equation is re-
estimated using two interactions of price shocks (always controlling for country and time 
fixed effects): one with a dummy for high violence levels illustrated with red colour; and 
other with a dummy for relatively low violence levels illustrated with blue colour. 
The estimation results of high and low violence specific changes in commodity price index 
for democratic countries are consistent with the findings from Table 2 confirming that, on 
average, resource shocks do not have significant consequences on conflict possibility when 
they occur in countries with cohesive institutions. Considering the impact of these shocks 
across infra-marginal changes for autocracies instead provides further intriguing results. For 
deeply entrenched autocracies, the impact of price shocks on conflict is virtually nil. Moving 
                                                          
24
 It can be easily checked that this is equivalent to including the interactions of price shocks with both dummies 
for high and low violence level subsamples. However, the implementation of the specification in column 4 has 
the advantage of demonstrating whether the price shock effects for relatively stable countries significantly differ 
from the reference group with high violence levels, at the same time enabling us to distinguish whether these 
effects are significantly different from zero.     
25
 The potential outlier countries are identified as those associated with the combination of experiencing the 
highest frequency of high and low political violence within each violence group for each bin. 
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from deeply to moderately entrenched autocracies reveals a positive impact (significant at 
10% level) of price shocks for relatively low threat level countries in the [-8,-5] interval, 
which in turn demonstrates strong quantitative significance (at 1% level) when the subsample 
in the [-5,-3] interval is considered. For the least entrenched autocracies (interval of [-3, 0]) 
with high political threat levels instead, the positive shock to price changes significantly 
decreases the probability of conflict outbreak.
26
 It is also of emphasis that in all cases across 
the bins, relatively lower initial political threat levels within subsamples provides relatively 
less opportunity cost for conflict possibility compared with high initial threat level countries, 
which supports the hypothesis that the marginal impact of price shocks on conflict outbreak is 
increasing while political violence level decreases. These results also suggest that average 
insignificant price shock effect on conflict for relatively low violence level autocracies in 
Table 2 (column 4) is driven by the fact that two opposing effects cancel each other out. 
Altogether, these findings demonstrate that (i) there is an absence of evidence between 
resource windfalls and conflict outbreak for democracies and for stable autocracies (as in e.g., 
Bazzi and Blattman, 2011); (ii) there is a positive association for unstable autocracies if 
initial political violence level is relatively low (as in e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Besley 
and Persson, 2008); and a negative association if an unstable autocratic country’s political 
violence level is high (as in e.g., Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Bruckner and Ciccone, 
2010). 
3.2   Resource Windfalls and Growth 
The analysis now turns to the exploration of the impact of resource shocks on economic 
growth with the emphasis of the importance of political institutions and within-country 
political violence levels to explain this relationship. The supposition for the growth analysis 
is that resource wealth is associated with higher economic performance only for countries 
with stable socio-economic and political environment, while significantly deteriorating 
growth for unstable countries with non-cohesive political institutions. 
The estimation results for this analysis are presented in Table 3. The first column derives this 
relationship linearly where growth responds to the changes in commodity price index in the 
                                                          
26
 The associated quantitative significance of one standard deviation increase in price shocks for the subsample 
in the [-5,-3] ([-3, 0]) interval is estimated as 3.38 (-6.41) percentage points among relatively low (high) threat 
level countries. 
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presence of additional control set. The results are consistent with the existing literature where 
a positive shock from resource windfalls is associated with higher economic growth. The 
statistically significant effect implies that one standard deviation increase in commodity price 
index is associated with an increase in economic performance of about 0.33 percentage 
points. 
The approach to capture the non-linear relationship between resource windfalls and growth 
conditional on political institutions and within-country political violence levels is twofold. 
Under the first (column 2), the specification, in addition to separating the resource shocks 
into autocracy/democracy specific price change index according to a country’s initial political 
contestability levels, also includes the initial level of polity2 (interacted with an autocracy 
dummy), both by itself and interacted with the autocracy specific price change index, 
enabling us to estimate how price shock effects on growth vary when moving from deeply to 
moderately entrenched autocracies, given the amplification of political violence in this 
direction.
27
 The second approach (column 3) instead applies the same strategy as in column 4 
in Table 2 in presence of an additional control set to estimate how the relationships between 
resource windfalls, political regimes and violence are reflected onto economic growth. 
The estimation results demonstrate that for democracies resource windfalls are positively 
associated with growth, while in autocracies this association is generally negative and 
diminishing in the initial level of autocracy, i.e. an increase in the price change index is more 
detrimental for growth in relatively unstable autocratic regimes. Stratifying this association 
into high and low violence levels reveals that resource windfalls are harmful to economic 
growth only for autocracies with high political violence levels, while this association is 
positive if within-country political threat level is low. Regarding quantitative significance, the 
impact on growth of one standard deviation increase in the commodity price index change is 
estimated to be 1.09 percentage points among democracies, -0.81 percentage points for high 
                                                          
27
 The inclusion of an interaction term between democracy specific price change index and the initial level of 
polity2 (interacted with a democracy dummy) again does not reveal significant differential impact of resource 
windfalls on growth, also illustrating insignificant interaction effect when the democracy specific price change 
is stratified into political threat categories (results available upon request). Therefore, the specifications during 
the rest of analysis omit any interactions of democracy specific price change index. 
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within-country threat level (unstable) autocracies, and 0.33 percentage points among low 
within-country threat level (stable) autocracies.
28
  
Coefficient estimates of additional explanatory variables also enter with the expected signs. 
Estimated coefficients on initial levels of income and inflation rate are negative, statistically 
significant, and indicate strong quantitative effects. Trade openness and international reserves 
ratios are always positive and typically exhibits a strong relationship with growth. 
In summary, the findings show that an increase in commodity price shocks are positively 
associated with economic performance in democracies and in politically stable autocracies, 
while significantly deteriorating growth for politically unstable autocracies. Thus the analysis 
confirms that, despite the arguments in the literature, resource windfalls can lead to slower 
growth (even when commodity price shocks measurement is considered) conditional on poor 
governance of resource revenues. 
3.2.1. Robustness Checks 
Table 4 examines the robustness of the results estimated for the relationship between price 
shocks and growth for the approaches in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 to the exclusion of 
countries whose resource wealth accounts for only a small share of GDP. For these countries 
it is less likely that price changes would represent large windfalls, and hence would not 
provide motivation to engage in self-preservation activities or oppose the incumbent 
government, thus focussing on a sample with larger commodity shares is arguably a better 
test for the sensitivity of the results. Columns 1 and 2 exclude countries in the first decile of 
the average share distribution (respectively, 13 and 11 countries); columns 3 and 4 exclude 
countries in the first quartile (35 and 30 countries); and columns 5 and 6 exclude all countries 
below the median average share (69 and 59 countries). Despite the significant drop in the 
sample size, the results from baseline sample remain robust at least at the 10% significance 
level in all cases and are generally reinforced as the threshold to be included in the sample 
progressively increases. In particular, the point estimates for the autocracies (democracies) in 
columns 1, 3 and 5 (columns 2, 4 and 6) become more (less) negative (positive) as the 
analysis focuses on more resource dependent countries. 
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 The impact of resource windfalls on growth for low threat level autocracies are calculated by summing the 
autocracy specific price shock estimates (-0.732 + 1.033), multiplying by average standard deviation of 0.011, 
and then multiplying by 100 to convert to a percentage-point measurement. 
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Table 5 addresses the reasonable concern that commodity prices can be affected by 
expectations of economic and political developments in the main world producers, and hence 
shaping the decision-making process of incumbent government regarding to make an 
investment into self-preservation activities, especially in places where politics is the only 
road to richness. The investigation therefore excludes from the sample three subsets of 
countries: (i) those belonging to OPEC; (ii) big energy producers; (iii) and large commodity 
producers accounting for significant shares of total world production.
29
 In all cases, the 
results remain robust at least at the 10% significance level with coefficient estimates of the 
variables of interest lying mostly within one standard deviation of the full sample estimate. 
The potential influence on the results of several additional subsets of countries is also 
considered. The collection of these subsets reflects countries singled out due to their resource 
dependence and political violence experiences across autocracy/democracy spectrum during 
the time period spanned by the sample. The results of this exercise are illustrated in Tables 6 
and 7. For each subset, Tables 6 and 7 report the list of countries, their 1990 net export 
shares, political contestability and violence levels, growth rates measured over the sample 
period, and the coefficient estimates of variables of interest as specified above for the first 
and the second approach. 
Table 6 checks the sensitivity of the results under the first approach to the exclusion of 
resource abundant countries resting at the top and bottom of the autocracy/democracy 
spectrum. The results of this exercise are demonstrated for two subsets of countries with high 
net export shares (above the 75
th
 percentile): (i) countries placed at the bottom quartile of 
political contestability level; (ii) and countries located at the top quartile of the 
autocracy/democracy spectrum. The coefficient estimates of the variables of interest change 
very little given the removal of any one of the subsets under consideration, lying within one 
standard deviation of the full sample estimates. What does change somewhat is the statistical 
                                                          
29
 The investigation treats Indonesia as an OPEC country, as it belonged to the organisation almost during the 
whole sample period, but excludes Angola and Ecuador who joined the OPEC in 2007, and Gabon who was a 
member of the OPEC only for the period of 1975-1994. Alternative treatments of these countries do not alter the 
results. Big energy (oil, natural gas, gasoline, uranium and coal) producers reflect countries whose principal net 
export commodity production share accounts for more than 2.5% of total world supply. The list of large 
commodity producers instead captures all countries whose principal net export commodity production share 
belongs to the list of top 15 biggest producers (according to the latest estimates) in the world by commodity. 
Please see Appendix Table B3. 
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significance of the interaction term with initial autocracy specific political contestability level 
in the case when the exclusion of the first subset is employed. 
The second collection of subsets includes countries singled out due to their political violence 
experiences among autocratic economies located at the bottom quartile of 
autocracy/democracy spectrum, whose net exports accounts for above the mean of GDP 
share. Two subsets are considered: the 11 autocratic countries with high political violence 
levels specified as those below the mean; and the 10 relatively stable autocracies with 
political violence levels above the mean. The impact of removing these subsets of countries 
under the second approach is reported in Table 7. Once again, point estimates are not altered 
greatly, lying within 1.5 standard deviations of the full sample estimates, although showing 
some sensitivity for statistical significances across subsets. Overall, the general pattern of 
results reported in Table 3 remains apparent given the exclusion of both collection of 
countries from the sample.
30
 
Collectively, the results from Tables 4-7 suggest that the non-linear relationship between 
commodity price shocks and growth does not seem attributable to just a number of 
exceptional countries exerting a large influence. 
Table 8 deals with the issue of commodity typology. An important distinction that has been 
made in the literature is the role of point and energy source commodities (e.g., Isham et al., 
2005; De Soysa and Neumayer, 2007), which is believed to induce a higher risk of conflict, 
foster weaker institutional capacity and provide higher pay-offs from non-productive 
lobbying and rent-seeking activities, as they are generally more valuable. Therefore columns 
1-2 and 3-4 break down the change in commodity price index, respectively, into point and 
energy sources. Although, the significances for energy source commodity price index change 
show some sensitivity across specifications, the coefficient estimates of the variables of 
interest change little lying within one standard deviation of the full sample estimates. Overall, 
the general pattern of results is consistent with findings reported in Table 3.
31
  
                                                          
30
 An analogous analysis employing the sample restrictions as in Table 6 (Table 7) under the second (first) 
approach is also considered where the results remain robust at least at the 10% significance level in all cases 
(available upon request).   
31
 An analogous analysis has been carried for diffuse and non-energy source commodity exporting countries. 
The findings reveal that the price shocks are not detrimental within autocracies typically illustrating 
insignificant impact on growth (available upon request).  
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4. Conclusion 
The empirical analysis has confirmed that the impact of resource windfalls on economic 
growth, political system and conflict depends on government performance and can lead to 
slower growth, bad institutions and higher conflict potential if the additional revenues from 
resource shocks are not being spent productively.  
The investigation has illustrated that institutional quality and within-country political 
violence/stability levels, to a large extent, are able to explain the ambiguity behind the 
confronting results in the resource literature. In particular, re-assessing the price shock effects 
on conflict outbreak, the analysis has shown that the resource windfalls have no significant 
consequences in democracies and in politically stable autocracies. In contrast, for politically 
unstable autocracies, the significant impact from resource windfalls is conditional on a 
country’s initial political violence level. Specifically, a positive shock to an autocratic 
country’s flow of resource rents with high political threat levels decreases conflict possibility, 
while leading to higher potential for violence if within country political threat level is 
relatively low. 
The investigation has also contributed to the growth literature showing that resource shocks 
are positively associated with growth in democracies and in politically stable autocracies, 
while deteriorating a country’s economic performance for politically unstable autocracies.      
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Figure 1: Summary of Political Violence over Political Regime Types 
 
 
Note: Respective cross-country average statistics of political violence/stability over political regime types are summarized for the period of 
1984-2010 and a sample of 119 countries. Red bars represent average mean of political violence ± one standard deviation, while empty bars 
correspond to its maximum and minimum value in each interval. Mean line of political violence corresponds to the value of 8.7. The number 
of observations for eight intervals when moving from “autocratic” to “democratic” bins is 6, 8, 14, 12, 12, 9, 25 and 33 respectively. 
 
Figure 2: Partial Regression Plots for Commodity Price Shocks and Growth 
 
 
Note: The set of regressors includes initial levels of logged income, trade openness, log of inflation rate, international reserves ratio, country 
and time-specific fixed effects. The figures are produced using OLS regressions. 
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Figure 3: Estimated Coefficients of Price Shocks on Conflict at Different Bins 
 
 
Note: The graph plots the estimated impact of high and low violence specific price shocks on conflict conditional on initial polity2 levels for 
each bin. Red spikes represent 95% confidence bands for high violence specific price shock estimates, while confidence intervals for low 
violence sample are illustrated with blue colour. The bins are constructed so to maintain the symmetry around the zero threshold, while 
maximising the number of observations and minimizing the differences in frequency across them. The number of observations for eight 
intervals when moving from “autocratic” to “democratic” bins is 110, 357, 134, 103, 88, 124, 327 and 426, respectively. The eliminated 
countries for the 1st bin are Oman and Syria; 2nd bin China and Cameroon; 3rd bin Gabon and Sudan; 4th bin Gambia and Guinea; 5th bin Mali 
and Pakistan; 6th bin Malaysia and Lebanon; 7th bin Argentina and Columbia; 8th bin Australia, France, Netherlands, Portugal, United 
Kingdom, United States and Israel. The method of estimation is the least squares with robust standard errors clustered by 
country. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Growth, Political Regimes, Political Violence and Conflict Onset 
 
Sample split Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Income levels 
Lower Mid./Low Growth 89 1.698 6.579 
 Polity2 89 -0.371 6.684 
 Violence/Stability 74 7.976 2.474 
 Conflict Onset 59 0.049 0.216 
     
High/Upper-Mid. Growth 46 1.739 7.079 
 Polity2 46 5.662 7.114 
 Violence/Stability 45 10.07 1.972 
 Conflict Onset 18 0.035 0.185 
Panel B: Resource Dependence levels 
Low Polity2 101 2.408 7.185 
 Violence/Stability 89 8.784 2.551 
     
High Polity2 34 -1.284 7.248 
 Violence/Stability 30 8.585 2.406 
Note: Summary statistics for growth rates and polity2 are based on country averages for the period of 1963-2010 and a sample of 135 
countries. Political violence/stability and civil conflict onset statistics are restricted to the period of 1984-2010 and summarized for 119 and 
77 countries data set respectively. 
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Table 2 
 Commodity Price Shocks and Conflict  
Dependent Variable: Civil Conflict Onset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Δ Index -0.612* 
(0.346) 
-4.097* 
(2.146) 
  
Δ Index* Violencet-1  0.389* 
(0.209) 
  
Δ Indexd    -8.254 
(5.692) 
-1.300 
(0.971) 
Δ Indexa    -2.791* 
(1.585) 
-2.072** 
(0.969) 
Δ Indexd* Violencet-1   0.849 
(0.623) 
 
Δ Indexa* Violencet-1   0.256* 
(0.149) 
 
Δ Indexa* Violencelow    2.077*** 
(0.763) 
Violence t-1  -0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1709 1612 1597 1597 
Note: ***, **, * represent significance of estimates respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The method of estimation is least squares. 
Robust standard errors clustered by country are presented in the parentheses. 
 
Table 3 
Commodity Price Shocks and Growth 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
  (1) (2) (3) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.037*** 
(0.011) 
-0.080*** 
(0.016) 
-0.078*** 
(0.015) 
Trade openness 0.036*** 
(0.012) 
0.035** 
(0.016) 
0.021** 
(0.011) 
Inflation (log) -0.026*** 
(0.009) 
-0.026** 
(0.009) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
Reserves/GDP ratio 0.097* 
(0.056) 
0.127* 
(0.066) 
0.088 
(0.056) 
Δ Index 0.297** 
(0.145) 
  
Δ Indexd   0.645* 
(0.367) 
0.995*** 
(0.351) 
Δ Indexa   -0.567*** 
(0.201) 
-0.732*** 
(0.215) 
Δ Indexa*Plt-1,a   -0.113*** 
(0.038) 
 
Δ Indexa* Violencelow   1.033*** 
(0.262) 
Plt-1,a  -0.005*** 
(0.002) 
 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES 
Observations 4337 4324 2428 
Specification tests 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.926 0.993 0.976 
(b) Serial Correlation:    
     First-order 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     Second-order 0.691 0.965 0.260 
Note: The estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). ***, **, * represent 
significance of estimates respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 4 
 Excluding Low Export Share Countries 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
  Above 1st Decile Share Above 1st Quartile Share Above Median Share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ Indexd 0.944** 
(0.402) 
0.984*** 
(0.355) 
0.901** 
(0.401) 
0.962** 
(0.383) 
0.912** 
(0.395) 
0.625** 
(0.236) 
Δ Indexa  -0.777*** 
(0.206) 
-0.739*** 
(0.219) 
-0.803*** 
(0.212) 
-0.762*** 
(0.236) 
-0.812*** 
(0.219) 
-0.622* 
(0.334) 
Δ Indexa*Plt-1,a  -0.159*** 
(0.031) 
 -0.163*** 
(0.033) 
 -0.164*** 
(0.034) 
 
Δ Indexa* Violencelow  1.029*** 
(0.267) 
 1.052*** 
(0.296) 
 0.829** 
(0.409) 
Plt-1,a -0.007* 
(0.004) 
 -0.009** 
(0.004) 
 -0.011** 
(0.005) 
 
Control Set YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3885 2214 3268 1810 2122 1190 
Specification tests 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.925 0.999 0.143 0.723 0.187 0.942 
(b) Serial Correlation:       
     First-order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
     Second-order 0.262 0.270 0.435 0.266 0.100 0.389 
Note: In addition to the variables of interest reported above, all specifications employ an additional control set which includes initial levels 
of logged income, trade openness, log of inflation rate and international reserves ratio. Columns 1-2, 3-4 and 5-6 exclude countries below 
the first decile, the first quartile and the median of the average commodity export share distribution, respectively. The respective number of 
countries eliminated in columns 1 (2), 3 (4) and 5 (6) are 13 (11), 35 (30), and 69 (59). The estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag 
restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table 5 
 Excluding Big Producers 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
  Exclude OPEC 
Countries 
Exclude Big Energy 
Producers 
Exclude Large  
Commodity Producers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ Indexd 0.596* 
(0.339) 
0.907** 
(0.424) 
0.966** 
(0.403) 
1.239*** 
(0.463) 
0.974* 
(0.535) 
1.695*** 
(0.449) 
Δ Indexa  -0.682** 
(0.339) 
-0.711** 
(0.322) 
-0.449* 
(0.234) 
-0.674** 
(0.297) 
-0.458* 
(0.262) 
-0.654** 
(0.294) 
Δ Indexa*Plt-1,a  -0.175*** 
(0.068) 
 -0.101*** 
(0.038) 
 -0.105** 
(0.049) 
 
Δ Indexa* Violencelow  0.938* 
(0.476) 
 0.924** 
(0.401) 
 0.944** 
(0.393) 
Plt-1,a -0.003 
(0.002) 
 -0.003 
(0.002) 
 -0.009 
(0.006) 
 
Control Set YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4088 2267 3829 2118 2155 1140 
Specification tests 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.752 0.169 0.313 0.234 0.257 0.982 
(b) Serial Correlation:       
     First-order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     Second-order 0.817 0.537 0.710 0.451 0.339 0.880 
Note: In addition to the variables of interest reported above, all specifications employ an additional control set which includes initial levels 
of logged income, trade openness, log of inflation rate and international reserves ratio. The estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag 
restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 6  
Exclusion of Countries with Unusual Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
Country 1990 Net  
Export share 
Average 
Polity2 
Av. Political 
Violence 
Average 
Growth Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove Autocratic (<25th percentile)  
Countries with High Commodity Export Shares 
Algeria 0.11 -5.67 6.68 0.02    
Cameroon 0.12 -6.15 7.12 0.004    
Congo, Rep. 0.35 -5.19 7.89 0.02    
Cote d’Ivoire 0.24 -6.13 8.52 0.01    
Gabon 0.33 -4.67 9.36 0.01 Δ Indexd 
Iran 0.07 -5.81 7.59 0.02 0.803 0.402 0.048 
Kuwait 0.28 -7.6 8.86 0.01 Δ Indexa 
Libya 0.29 -7 8.90 -0.02 -0.545 0.251 0.032 
Malawi 0.09 -3.77 7.59 0.01 Δ Indexa*Plt-1,a 
Mauritania 0.23 -6.10 N/A 0.03 -0.126 0.088 0.152 
Oman 0.36 -9.29 9.78 0.03    
Qatar 0.29 -10 9.58 0.04    
Saudi Arabia 0.27 -10 8.96 0.001    
Swaziland 0.08 -8.83 N/A 0.02    
Syria 0.08 -8.25 9.52 0.01    
Remove Democratic (>75th percentile)  
Countries with High Commodity Export Shares 
     Δ Indexd 
Mauritius 0.09 9.67 N/A 0.03 0.627 0.351 0.076 
New Zealand 0.08 10 11.79 0.01 Δ Indexa 
Trinidad & Tobago 0.08 8.85 8.71 0.03 -0.649 0.170 0.000 
Venezuela 0.16 7.35 9.19 0.004 Δ Indexa*Plt-1,a 
     -0.137 0.029 0.000 
Note: In addition to the variables of interest reported above, all specifications control for initial levels of logged income, trade openness, log 
of inflation rate, international reserves ratio, autocracy specific polity2, country and time-specific fixed effects. The estimation results are 
achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates respectively at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 7  
Exclusion of Countries with Unusual Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
Country 1990 Net  
Export share 
Average 
Polity2 
Average  
Violence 
Average 
Growth Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove Resource Dependent Autocratic Countries  
with High  Political Violence Levels 
Algeria 0.11 -5.67 6.68 0.02    
Angola 0.30 -3.23 5.34 0.04    
Bahrain 0.07 -8.98 8.33 0.001 Δ Indexd 
Cameroon 0.12 -6.15 7.12 0.004 1.320 0.385 0.001 
Congo Rep. 0.35 -5.19 7.89 0.02 Δ Indexa 
Cote d’Ivoire 0.24 -6.13 8.52 0.01 -0.469 0.298 0.119 
Iran 0.07 -5.81 7.59 0.02 Δ Indexa* Violencelow 
Morocco 0.03 -7.38 8.41 0.03 0.771 0.297 0.011 
Togo 0.06 -5.13 7.40 -0.001    
Uganda 0.05 -3.17 5.94 0.01    
Zimbabwe 0.27 -3.89 7.34 0.001    
Remove Resource Dependent Autocratic Countries  
with Low Political Violence Levels 
Gabon 0.33 -4.67 9.36 0.01    
Kazakhstan 0.04 -4.62 10.65 0.02    
Kuwait 0.28 -7.6 8.86 0.01 Δ Indexd 
Libya 0.29 -7 8.90 -0.01 1.109 0.357 0.002 
Oman 0.36 -9.29 9.78 0.03 Δ Indexa 
Qatar 0.29 -10 9.58 0.04 -0.476 0.261 0.071 
Saudi Arabia 0.27 -10 8.96 0.001 Δ Indexa* Violencelow 
Syria 0.08 -8.25 9.52 0.01 0.684 0.447 0.129 
Tunisia 0.03 -6.29 9.75 0.02    
Vietnam 0.09 -7 9.43 0.05    
Note: In addition to the variables of interest reported above, all specifications control for initial levels of logged income, trade openness, log 
of inflation rate, international reserves ratio, country and time-specific fixed effects. The estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag 
restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table 8 
Typologies of commodities 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
  Point source  
Commodity price index 
Energy source  
Commodity price index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Δ Indexd  0.906* 
(0.467) 
1.323*** 
(0.497) 
1.469* 
(0.793) 
0.849* 
(0.506) 
Δ Indexa  -0.493** 
(0.189) 
-0.802*** 
(0.245) 
-0.433 
(0.294) 
-0.684 
(0.494) 
Δ Indexa*Plt-1,a  -0.107*** 
(0.030) 
 -0.124*** 
(0.037) 
 
Δ Indexa* Violencelow  1.127*** 
(0.302) 
 0.804 
(0.625) 
Plt-1,a -0.002 
(0.002) 
 -0.007* 
(0.004) 
 
Control Set YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4161 2404 2292 1407 
Specification tests 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.999 0.348 0.994 0.985 
(b) Serial Correlation:     
     First-order 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.011 
     Second-order 0.932 0.295 0.109 0.426 
Note: In addition to the variables of interest reported above, all specifications employ an additional control set which includes initial levels 
of logged income, trade openness, log of inflation rate and international reserves ratio. The estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag 
restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table A1 
Long and Short-Run Impact of Commodity Price Index 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Estimates of long-run coefficients 
Trade openness t-1 0.027*** 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
Inflation (log) t-1 -0.025*** 
(0.009) 
-0.024*** 
(0.009) 
-0.023** 
(0.010) 
Reserves/GDP ratio t-1 0.066** 
(0.033) 
0.063* 
(0.034) 
0.049 
(0.041) 
Commodity export price index t-1 -0.085*** 
(0.027) 
  
Points export price index t-1  -0.086*** 
(0.029) 
 
Diffuse export price index t-1  0.136 
(0.379) 
 
Energy export price index t-1   -0.187*** 
(0.057) 
Non-energy export price index t-1   0.301** 
(0.116) 
 Estimates of short-run coefficients 
GDP per capita (log)t-1 -0.047*** 
(0.006) 
-0.046*** 
(0.006) 
-0.045*** 
(0.008) 
Δ GDP per capita (log)t-1 0.089** 
(0.034) 
0.103*** 
(0.037) 
0.135** 
(0.053) 
Δ Trade openness t-1 -0.005 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
-0.013 
(0.017) 
Δ Inflation (log) t-1 0.004 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
Δ Reserves/GDP ratio t-1 0.171** 
(0.079) 
0.173** 
(0.079) 
0.176 
(0.140) 
Δ Commodity export price index t 0.342** 
(0.155) 
0.336** 
(0.158) 
0.356** 
(0.153) 
Δ Commodity export price index t-1 0.311*** 
(0.104) 
0.314*** 
(0.103) 
0.335*** 
(0.114) 
Δ Commodity export price index t-2 0.424*** 
(0.152) 
0.413*** 
(0.153) 
0.505*** 
(0.163) 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES 
Observations 4200 4041 2225 
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.26 
Note: ***, **, * represent significance of estimates respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors clustered by country are 
presented in the parentheses. 
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Appendix B: Principal Export Commodity Price Shocks and Political Regimes 
For the replication analysis of the relationship between resource windfalls and political 
system, the investigation employs changes in principal export commodity price measurement 
constructed following Caselli and Tesei (2011). In particular, the measurement of resource 
windfalls at country level is computed as follows. First, for each country and for each year 
that data is available, all commodities are ranked by their value (share) of exports. The 
commodity that is ranked first in the largest number of years within country is identified as 
country’s principal commodity (see Appendix Table B1). Finally, each country’s principal 
commodity is matched with an annual time series of that commodity’s world prices (not 
indices). The data for export values and commodity prices are from the United Nation’s 
Comtrade and IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) dataset respectively.   
The estimated specification used is identical to the one employed in columns 3 and 4 of Table 
3 as in Caselli and Tesei (2011) where the dependent variable, measured as one year change 
in polity2, responses to the lagged change in the price of the principal commodity averaged 
over the previous three years, i.e. if the change in polity2 is measured between years t-1 and t, 
the change in commodity prices is the average over the years t-4, t-3, t-2 and t-1. The 
construction of interaction terms is accomplished firstly by separating out the price change 
variable into two variables according to the initial levels (measured as four year lags or year 
t-4 in order to be consistent with starting date for the price shock) of political contestability: 
the first is an interaction between the change in principal export commodity price and a 
dummy for autocracy, and the second is an interaction with a dummy for democracy. Then 
the full specification includes initial levels of polity2 (separated into two by interacting with 
autocracy and democracy dummies) both, by themselves and interacted with the 
(autocracy/democracy specific) principal commodity price change.  
The first two columns in Appendix Table B2 present the results from this replication exercise 
where column 1 estimates the non-linear relationship between resource windfalls and 
political system using OLS, while column 2 employs the GMM system estimator. The results 
are consistent with original findings where commodity price shocks have significant negative 
impact on politics only in autocratic countries, which is decreasing in initial level of 
autocracy.  
In addition to the replication analysis, the subsequent two columns estimate this relationship 
non-linearly conditional also on initial political violence/stability levels. Firstly, the 
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specification reported in column 3, in addition to separating the resource shocks into 
autocracy/democracy specific price changes according to a country’s initial political 
contestability levels, also includes the initial level of political violence/stability, both by itself 
and interacted with the autocracy/democracy specific principal commodity price change; 
while column 4 re-estimates the effect of price shocks for the subsamples with high (low) 
political violence levels by interacting autocracy/democracy specific price shocks with a 
dummy that takes the value of unity if a country’s initial political violence level is below 
(above) the sample mean and zero otherwise.  
The results from the non-linear estimation of these relationships provide support for the 
original findings, and indicate that positive shocks in commodity prices have a negative direct 
impact on political system in politically violent autocracies, which is marginally increasing 
while within-country political violence level decreases. Stratifying this association for the 
subsamples reveals that the significant consequences from price shocks is only the case for 
politically unstable autocratic countries, while resource windfalls have no impact on politics 
when they occur in democracies and in politically stable autocracies. 
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Table B1: Countries by Principal Commodity 
Princ. Comm. No. Countries Countries 
Aluminium 9 Bahrain, Germany, Guinea, Jamaica, Lebanon, Mozambique, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland 
Bananas 2 Honduras, Panama 
Beef 4 Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ireland, Mali 
Coal 3 Australia, Czech Republic, Poland 
Cocoa 2 Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana 
Coconut oil 1 Philippines 
Coffee 13 Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Madagascar, 
Nicaragua, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda 
Copper 5 Botswana, Chile, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Zambia 
Cotton 2 Lesotho, Pakistan 
Fish 5 Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Denmark, Korea Rep., Namibia 
Gasoline 1 Italy 
Groundnuts 3 Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan 
Groundnuts oil 1 Senegal 
Pig iron 6 Albania, Armenia, Bhutan, Georgia, Japan, Ukraine 
Iron ore 3 Liberia, Mauritania, Sierra Leone 
Jute 1 Nepal 
Natural Gas 3 Belgium, Bolivia, Netherlands 
Oil 31 Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, China, Congo Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Indonesia, 
Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, UAE, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen  
Oranges 2 Israel, Spain, Turkey 
Palm kernel oil 1 Benin 
Phosphates 3 Jordan, Morocco, Togo 
Pulp 1 Portugal 
Rice 1 Thailand 
Rubber 2 Cambodia, Singapore 
Silver 1 South Africa 
Soybean 2 Paraguay, United States 
Sugar 5 Dominican Rep., Fiji, Guyana, Mauritius, Swaziland 
Sunflower oil  1 Moldova 
Tea 3 India, Kenya, Sri Lanka 
Tobacco 5 Cyprus, Greece, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Zimbabwe 
Uranium 1 Niger 
Wheat 2 Argentina, France 
Wood 8 Austria, Canada, Central African Rep., Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Sweden 
Wool 2 New Zealand, Uruguay 
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Table B2 
Commodity Price Shocks and Political Regimes 
Dependent variable: Change in Political System (Δ polity2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Δ Prd -0.042 
(0.516) 
-0.208 
(0.631) 
-2.030 
(1.365) 
 
Δ Pra -1.629** 
(0.765) 
-1.898** 
(0.761) 
-3.316* 
(1.872) 
 
Δ Prd*Plt-4,d 0.031 
(0.057) 
0.059 
(0.076) 
  
Δ Pra*Plt-4,a -0.185* 
(0.111) 
-0.221** 
(0.110) 
  
Δ Prd * Violencet-4    0.190 
(0.143) 
 
Δ Pra * Violencet-4   0.356* 
(0.202) 
 
Δ Prd * Violence high    -0.896 
(1.116) 
Δ Prd * Violence low    0.098 
(0.343) 
Δ Pra * Violence high    -1.710* 
(0.939) 
Δ Pra * Violence low    0.628 
(0.620) 
Plt-4,d -0.095*** 
(0.015) 
-0.144** 
(0.067) 
  
Plt-4,a -0.074*** 
(0.017) 
-0.044 
(0.041) 
  
Violence t-1   -0.088 
(0.064) 
 
Estimation method OLS GMM GMM GMM 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5036 5036 2419 2419 
Specification tests 
(a) Hansen Test:  0.993 0.483 0.772 
(b) Serial Correlation:     
     First-order  0.000 0.000 0.000 
     Second-order  0.242 0.746 0.730 
Note: ***, **, * represent significance of estimates respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The dependent variable is the t-1 to t change in 
polity2. The method of estimation in columns 1 and 2-4 are least squares and system-GMM, respectively. Robust standard errors presented 
in the parentheses for the least squares estimation are clustered at country level, while system-GMM estimation applies the Windmeijer 
(2005) small-sample correction. 
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Table B3: Big Producers by Principal Commodity 
Princ. Comm. No. Countries Countries 
Aluminium 4 Bahrain, Germany, Lebanon, Mozambique 
Beef 1 Ireland 
Coal 2 Australia, Poland 
Cocoa 2 Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana 
Coconut oil 1 Philippines 
Coffee 7 Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Uganda 
Copper 4 Chile, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Zambia 
Cotton 1 Pakistan 
Fish 2 Bangladesh, Korea Rep. 
Groundnuts 2 Gambia, Sudan 
Groundnuts oil 1 Senegal 
Pig iron 2 Japan, Ukraine 
Iron ore 1 Mauritania 
Jute 1 Nepal 
Natural Gas 1 Netherlands 
Oil 12 Algeria, China, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, 
Venezuela 
Oranges 2 Spain, Turkey 
Phosphates 2 Jordan, Morocco 
Rice 1 Thailand 
Rubber 1 Cambodia 
Soybean 2 Paraguay, United States 
Tea 3 India, Kenya, Sri Lanka 
Tobacco 2 Malawi, Zimbabwe 
Uranium 1 Niger 
Wheat 1 France 
Wood 3 Canada, Finland, Sweden 
Wool 1 New Zealand 
Note: Large producers reflect countries (63) whose principal net export commodity production share belongs to the list of top 15 biggest 
producers in the world by commodity. Data for production of commodities by country are obtained from the following sources: aluminium, 
copper, pig iron and iron ore from the United States Geological Survey; phosphates and uranium from the British Geological Survey; beef, 
cocoa, coconut oil, cotton, fish, jute, oranges, rice, tea, tobacco, wheat, wood and wool from the Food and Agricultural Organization; rubber 
from the Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries; groundnuts, groundnuts oil and soybeans from the US Department of 
Agriculture; coffee from the International Coffee Organization; oil, natural gas and coal from the US Energy Information Administration. 
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Appendix C: Data Description, Sources and Coverage 
Commodity export and import values for 1990 are collected from the United Nation’s 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database. For countries with missing 1990 net export values, the 
analysis employs net export values available in the year closest to 1990 where the maximum 
distance from 1990 ranges in ±10 years interval.
32
 Annual world commodity price indices are 
initially collected for 59 commodities from International Financial Statistics (IFS series 74 
and 76), except for the natural gas and gasoline, which are from the United States Energy 
Information Administration (EIA 2013, 9.4 and 9.10); and pig iron obtained from the United 
States Geological Survey. However, commodities of olive oil, poultry, swine meat, urea and 
uranium were left out of the sample due to lack of adequate data in the early sample periods. 
Therefore the results for countries, in which the weights of these commodities over the export 
share are relatively important (e.g., Niger), should be interpreted with caution. 
IFS price series have gaps for some commodities. Since the identical sample length is an 
important consideration for constructing the commodity price index measure, the analysis 
employed a combination of methods to generate missing values. For instance, the IFS price 
series for bananas and pepper are available only from 1975 and 1983 respectively; therefore 
missing values for the previous periods were replaced with the data from UNCTAD since the 
price series from both sources are almost identical. Three price series (coal, plywood and 
tobacco) have short gaps at the beginning of the sample period. Following Dehn (2000), these 
gaps were filled by holding the price constant at the value of the first available observation. 
Palm-kernel oil series have one missing value in the middle which was filled by linear 
interpolation. Missing values for oranges and barley (1962-1975) are replaced first with the 
rescaled price data available from FAOSTAT (Food and Agriculture Organisation) for the 
period 1966-1975, where the gap for 1962-1966 period was then filled by holding the price 
constant at the 1966 value.  
For price series with missing values for which other highly correlated price series are 
available, the missing values are generated using partial adjustment regression equation: 
                                               ln (
  
   
) = θ0 + θ1 ln (
  
   
) + θ2 ln(Yt-1) + εt                                                         
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 Any biases that might be generated by this choice are checked by re-estimating the main findings for the 
sample where countries with missing 1990 net export shares are removed. In all cases, the results remain robust 
at conventional significance levels (available upon request). 
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where Xt is the series with missing early values and Yt is a highly correlated series with a full 
set of observations. The regression is run on overlapping observations, and the coefficients 
are then used to “backcast” the missing observations. This method is used to fill the initial 
gap of 17 observations in the fish series and 8 observations in pulp series. The close 
correlates used were IFS fishmeal prices and plywood prices respectively. 
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Appendix D1: List of Countries 
 
Code Country Code Country Code Country 
1 Albania c 46 Ghana 91 Norway c 
2 Algeria 47 Greece c 92 Oman 
3 Angola 48 Guatemala 93 Pakistan 
4 Argentina 49 Guinea 94 Panama 
5 Armenia c 50 Guinea-Bissau 95 Papua New Guinea 
6 Australia 51 Guyana c 96 Paraguay 
7 Austria c 52 Haiti 97 Peru 
8 Azerbaijan 53 Honduras 98 Philippines c 
9 Bahrain c 54 India c 99 Poland c 
10 Bangladesh 55 Indonesia 100 Portugal 
11 Belgium c 56 Iran 101 Qatar c 
12 Benin cg 57 Ireland c 102 Romania 
13 Bhutan cg 58 Israel c 103 Russia 
14 Bolivia 59 Italy c 104 Rwanda cg 
15 Botswana c 60 Jamaica c 105 Saudi Arabia c 
16 Brazil c 61 Japan c 106 Senegal 
17 Burkina Faso 62 Jordan 107 Sierra Leone 
18 Burundi cg 63 Kazakhstan c 108 Singapore c 
19 Cambodia cg 64 Kenya 109 Slovak Rep. c 
20 Cameroon 65 Korea Rep. c 110 Slovenia 
21 Canada c 66 Kuwait 111 South Africa 
22 Cape Verde cg 67 Kyrgyzstan cg 112 Spain 
23 Central African Republic cg 68 Latvia c 113 Sri Lanka 
24 Chile 69 Lebanon 114 Sudan c 
25 China 70 Lesotho cg 115 Swaziland cg 
26 Colombia c 71 Liberia 116 Sweden c 
27 Congo, Rep. 72 Libya 117 Switzerland c 
28 Costa Rica c 73 Lithuania c 118 Syria 
29 Cote d’Ivoire 74 Madagascar 119 Tanzania 
30 Cyprus 75 Malawi c 120 Thailand 
31 Czech Republic c 76 Malaysia 121 Togo 
32 Denmark c 77 Mali 122 Trinidad and Tobago 
33 Djibouti cg 78 Mauritania cg 123 Tunisia 
34 Dominican Republic 79 Mauritius cg 124 Turkey 
35 Ecuador 80 Mexico 125 Uganda 
36 Egypt 81 Moldova 126 Ukraine c 
37 El Salvador 82 Morocco 127 United Arab Emirates c 
38 Ethiopia 83 Mozambique 128 United Kingdom 
39 Fiji cg 84 Namibia c 129 United States 
40 Finland c 85 Nepal cg 130 Uruguay 
41 France 86 Netherlands 131 Venezuela 
42 Gabon 87 New Zealand c 132 Vietnam 
43 Gambia 88 Nicaragua 133 Yemen 
44 Georgia cg 89 Niger 134 Zambia c 
45 Germany c 90 Nigeria 135 Zimbabwe 
Note: Subscripts c and g represent countries, respectively, those are excluded from the conflict onset and growth analysis when political 
violence/stability variable is employed. 
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Appendix D2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita (log) 5735 8.29 1.31 5.08 11.82 
GDP per capita growth rate  5735 0.02 0.07 -0.81 0.64 
Trade over GDP 5399 0.69 0.45 0.05 5.62 
Inflation (log (1+inflation rate)) 4800 0.12 0.28 -0.12 4.77 
Reserves over GDP  5397 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.52 
Polity2 5654 1.51 7.37 -10 10 
Δ Polity2 5642 0.09 1.78 -18 16 
Δ Principal Commodity Price  5717 0.04 0.25 -1.04 1.58 
Composite Commodity Price Index 5735 1.09 0.17 1.00 2.75 
Unlogged unweighted index (1980=100) 5735 82.37 43.06 3.89 693.06 
Commodity Exports to GDP (net) 5735 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.54 
Δ Commodity Price Index 5735 0.001 0.011 -0.184 0.193 
Δ Point source Commodity Price Index 5519 0.001 0.010 -0.127 0.193 
Δ Diffuse source Commodity Price Index 5735 0.000 0.001 -0.017 0.035 
Δ Energy source Commodity Price Index 3023 0.001 0.013 -0.069 0.192 
Δ Non-Energy source Commodity Price Index 5735 0.000 0.005 -0.061 0.084 
Political Violence/Stability 3036 8.73 2.52 0 12 
Civil Conflict Onset 1709 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Note: Summary statistics are based on panel country averages for the period of 1963-2010 and a sample of 135 countries, except the last 
two. Political violence/stability and civil conflict onset statistics are restricted to the period of 1984-2010 and summarized for 119 and 77 
countries data set respectively. 
 
 
Appendix D3: List of Commodities 
 
Non-agricultural 
Aluminium Gasoline Lead Oil Tin 
Coal Pig Iron Natural Gas Phosphatrock Zinc 
Copper Iron ore Nickel Silver  
Agricultural 
Bananas Cotton Linseed oil Pulp Soybeans 
Barley Fish Maize Rice Sugar 
Beef Fishmeal Oranges Rubber Sunflower oil 
Butter Groundnuts Palm-kernel oil Shrimp Tea 
Cocoa Groundnuts oil Palm oil Sisal Tobacco 
Coconut oil Hides Pepper Sorghum Wheat 
Coffee Jute Plywood Soybean meal Wood 
Copra Lamb Potash Soybean oil Wool 
Note: The categorisation of point source commodities is identified as all non-agricultural commodities plus coffee, cocoa, sugar and 
bananas. Energy source categorisation includes coal, gasoline, natural gas and oil. 
 
 
 
